Bibliotheken Online

Why peace fails

the causes and prevention of civil war recurrence

Charles T. Call

Buch

englisch

Call, Charles T. (Verfasser/-in) DNB

Georgetown University Press

Washington, DC

2012

xii, 315 p.

978-1-58901-894-5

Includes bibliographical references (p. [277]-302) and index.

peace
war
case study
civil war
nicaragua

Contents: Why peace fails: theory -- Examining the cases -- Implications for theory and practice.

Summary:
Call (international studies, American U.) analyzes causal patterns that explain the recurrence of organized political violence after civil wars seem to have ended. He challenges four dominant trends in postconflict scholarship: the emphasis on economic factors in civil war, the emphasis on international peacekeeping, the focus on state capacity over legitimization, and electoral democracy as the best framework for postwar governance. Organized into three parts, the book starts out explaining why peace fails then moves into several case studies from China, Tibet, Chechnya, Georgia, East Timor, the American Civil War, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Haiti and other sites from around the world. The final section represents the main findings of the book and argues for rethinking peacekeeping and for building legitimacy. Annotation ©2012 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com).

Table of Contents:
Terms of Use
List of Tablesp. x
Acknowledgmentsp. xi
Introduction: The Tragedy of Civil War Recurrencep. 1
The Importance of This Bookp. 2
The Central Argumentp. 3
Contributions to Theoryp. 6
Research Design and Methodologyp. 7
Organization of the Bookp. 17
Notesp. 20
Part IWhy Peace Fails: Theory
1 What Do We Know about Why Peace Fails?p. 25
What We Know about Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflictp. 26
Four Approaches to Peacebuildingp. 30
Clarifying Concepts: Exclusion, Inclusion, and Legitimacyp. 36
Conclusionp. 47
Notesp. 48
2 Is Civil War Recurrence Distinct from Its Onset? A Quantitative Analysis and the Limits Thereofp. 50
A Regression Analysis of Civil War Recurrencep. 51
The Contributions and Limitations of Quantitative Methods for Studying Civil Warsp. 59
Conclusionp. 65
Notesp. 66
Part IIExamining the Cases
3 Liberia: Exclusion and Civil War Recurrencep. 71
The First Civil Warp. 72
The Onset of Peacep. 74
The Second Civil War: A Brief Summaryp. 76
Charles Taylor's Exclusionary Behaviorp. 78
Alternative Explanationsp. 81
Insights from Liberia's Second Postwar Peace Processp. 88
Conclusionp. 91
Notesp. 94
4 Separatist Recurrences of Civil Warp. 96
Sudan: The Marginalization of the Southp. 100
Chechnya: Reneging and Resistancep. 106
Georgia and South Ossetia: Integration Backfiresp. 110
China and Tibet: Compelled from Autonomyp. 115
Analyzing Cases of Reneging on Territorial Autonomyp. 118
Notesp. 120
5 Nonseparatist Recurrences of Civil Warp. 122
Precipitating Exclusionary Behaviorp. 123
The Central African Republic: Exclusion and State Weaknessp. 124
Haiti: Political Exclusion and Recurrencep. 129
East Timor: Liberation, Statehood, and Exclusionp. 136
Zimbabwe: Liberation, Statehood, and Exclusionp. 146
Burundi and Rwanda: Chronic Exclusionary Behaviorp. 150
Alternative Explanations and Conclusionsp. 158
Notesp. 160
6 Recurrences That Defy the Argumentp. 162
Lebanon: Failed Powersharingp. 163
Mali: Failed Powersharingp. 167
Nicaragua: Externally Driven Recurrencep. 173
Peru: Exclusion, Coca, and Rebel Resurgencep. 177
Conclusionp. 179
Notesp. 181
7 Making Peace Stick: Inclusionary Politics and Twenty-Seven Nonrecurrent Civil Warsp. 183
Inclusion, Powersharing, and Peacebuilding Successp. 186
Powersharing and Peace Consolidation: Examining the Pool of Casesp. 192
Beyond Powersharing: Inclusionary Behavior and Peacep. 195
Peace and Exclusionary Behavior?p. 196
International Troops and "Frozen" Conflictsp. 202
Notesp. 209
Part IIIImplications for Theory and Practice
8 Conclusions for Theory: Legitimacy-Focused Peacebuildingp. 213
The Main Findings of the Bookp. 213
Rethinking the Aims and Approaches of Peacebuildingp. 218
Addressing Limitationsp. 230
Notesp. 235
9 Conclusions for Policy and Practice: Can External Actors Build Legitimacy after War?p. 236
Why Legitimacy Building Is Exceptionally Difficultp. 237
Beyond Blanket Inclusionary Formulas: Four "Moments" for Key Choices and External Strategyp. 245
Conclusionp. 273
Notesp. 275
Referencesp. 277
Indexp. 303

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