Bibliotheken Online

Protecting China's overseas interests

The Slow Shift away from non-interference

Mathieu Duchatel ; Oliver Bräuner ; Zhou Hang

Buch

englisch

Duchatel, Mathieu (Verfasser/-in) DNB
Bräuner, Oliver (Verfasser/-in) DNB
Hang, Zhou (Verfasser/-in) DNB

SIPRI Policy Paper

41

SIPRI

Stockholm

2014

72 p.

china

Summary:
Chinese foreign policy is slowly shifting away from a strict interpretation of noninterference, towards a pragmatic and incremental adaptation to new challenges to China’s globalizing economic and security interests. Although there has always
been a degree of flexibility in Chinese foreign policy regarding non-interference, even during the Maoist period, the principle has by and large remained a key guideline for diplomatic work and a major rhetorical tool. While non-interference continues to receive strong rhetorical support from China and is believed to be of great significance with respect to the protection of
China’s ‘core interests’, particularly on issues related to state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the socialist political system, a policy debate has emerged regarding the principle’s sustainability in recent years. Indeed, non-interference
was crafted in a different international environment in which China had few economic and security interests to defend beyond its borders. As a result of the globalization of the Chinese economic and human presence, the extent to which
non-interference is serving the national interest of China is increasingly being questioned. The rapid expansion of China’s overseas interests has led to an important policy debate in the Chinese strategic community. Many Chinese scholars expect
that the globalization of China’s interests will result in transformations in China’s national defence policy and highlight in particular the importance of naval power. At the same time, normative transformations in the international system in the
post-cold war era that have contributed to the erosion of sovereignty, such as the greater emphasis on human security, have also affected Chinese strategic debates regarding non-interference.
However, the mainstream Chinese academic community still maintains that the benefits of further adherence to non-interference outweigh the potential costs of a major policy change. China has engaged in a policy of pragmatic adaptation and has shown growing flexibility in its application of non-interference. The emergence of a number of new concepts, including ‘creative involvement’ and ‘constructive involvement’, facilitates this gradual change and equips China with more leeway to pursue an increasingly engaged foreign policy posture. Nevertheless, while Chinese overseas energy interests continue to grow rapidly, Chinese companies often operate in politically unstable countries and face increasing political and security risks, including armed conflict, political instability, terrorism, corruption, organized crime and piracy.
China’s non-interference policy, combined with a lack of experience and overseas power-projection capabilities, has imposed serious limits on Chinese attempts to protect its growing overseas energy interests. In order to overcome this handicap, China has diversified its diplomatic outreach and has attempted to mediate between conflict parties—as clearly demonstrated in China’s evolving approach to the conflicts between and within Sudan and South Sudan—although so far with limited success. At the same time, China has also strengthened the risk assessment, crisis response, corporate social responsibility and political insurance capacities of its national oil companies. These adaptations aim to optimize
the protection of Chinese energy interests in politically unstable or crisis areas, while maintaining the credibility of China’s official non-interference policy. Therefore, more radical approaches, especially the use of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) to protect energy assets abroad, seem unfeasible in the short-tomedium term. Over the past decade the protection of nationals abroad has also emerged as a
diplomatic priority for China. The number of Chinese individuals travelling or residing overseas has grown so rapidly that Chinese Government agencies lack accurate statistics in many countries. The boom in overseas travel and work by Chinese also means that Chinese citizens are more susceptible to risks and attacks abroad, and the globalization of Chinese firms and their investments in unstable countries and regions means that their employees face increasing safety risks. Protecting increasingly large numbers of nationals overseas could potentially shift Chinese foreign policy away from non-interference but, so far, China has preferred institutional adaption and capacity building. While Chinese Government
agencies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have integrated the issue as a priority, there is still room for improvements in crisis prevention and management. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sought to reinforce preventive measures, institutionalize its internal consular protection system and establish inter-agency coordination mechanisms to provide better service for Chinese citizens overseas. Additionally, in major emergencies, China has gradually accumulated experience in conducting non-combatant evacuation operations.
However, the sustainability of this approach is likely to be called into question by the growing involvement of armed actors, including the PLA, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and potentially private security companies, in the protection
of nationals abroad. There is still a degree of uncertainty regarding whether China will continue on the path of pragmatic adaptation within the non-interference framework, and the
degree of change on concrete policy outcomes that such an evolution would entail. The possibility of a dramatic policy change cannot be entirely discarded, as unforeseen events could precipitate change. China’s foreign policy could also
strictly remain within the boundaries of non-interference. Its ultimate strategic choice will certainly have far-reaching effects on global governance and international security. For states seeking greater international security cooperation with China, this ongoing transformation creates new challenges and opportunities.

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